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Abstract—This paper considers Lorden’s minimax quickest
change detection (QCD) problem with a privacy constraint.
The goal is to sanitize a signal to satisfy inference privacy
requirements while being able to detect a change quickly. We
show that the Generalized Likelihood Ratio (GLR) CuSum
achieves asymptotic optimality with a properly designed sanitiza-
tion channel. We formulate the design of this sanitization channel
as an optimization problem, which is however challenging to
solve. We propose relaxations to the optimization problem and
develop algorithms to obtain a solution. We also consider the
privacy-aware QCD problem under a decentralized framework
and propose algorithms to solve the relaxed channel design
problem under this framework.
Index Terms—Quickest change detection, inference privacy,
maximal Leakage, optimal stopping time, GLRT statistic
I. INTRODUCTION
Quickest change detection (QCD) is the problem of se-
quentially detecting a change in the statistical properties of
a signal. Given a sequence of independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) observations {xt : t ∈ N} with distribution
f up to an unknown change point ν and distribution g 6= f
after, the goal is to detect this change as quickly as possible,
subject to false alarm constraints. Traditionally, applications of
QCD can be found in manufacturing, in areas such as quality
control [1] where any change in the quality of products must
be quickly detected. With the proliferation of low-cost sensors,
QCD methods have also found applications in other areas such
as fraud detection [2], cognitive radio [3] and power system
line outage detection [4].
As sensor and computing technology become increasingly
ubiquitous and powerful, it becomes easier for an adversary
to infer sensitive information, such as lifestyle preferences
and location information, from available data. In many prac-
tical QCD applications, rather than having one distribution,
the distribution that generates the signal in the post-change
regime belongs to a finite set G = {g1, . . . , g|G|}. In some
applications, the distribution of some sensitive information U
may depend on the post-change distribution. Thus, knowing
which distribution g ∈ G generates the signal in the post-
change regime may reveal some information about U . One
example of such an application is occupancy detection. In an
Internet of Things (IoT) based occupancy detection system,
the occupancy sensor continuously measures attributes such as
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infrared radiation, temperature, humidity and carbon dioxide
levels, to quickly detect when a room becomes occupied so
that certain functions like turning on the air conditioning
system can be automated. A baseline distribution can be used
to model the fluctuation of these attributes with time when the
room is empty. However, fluctuations in these attributes when
the room is occupied can reveal the number of people and the
activity conducted in the room, leading to privacy leakage if
an adversary has access to the raw attribute signals. The goal
of privacy-aware QCD is to sanitize the attribute signals so
that the change from a vacant to an occupied room can still
be detected, while preserving the privacy of the occupants in
the room. In practice, we are unable to know the adversary’s
intent and hence would like to sanitize the signal so that
the largest improvement an adversary can achieve, over all
possible queries, is controlled.
In other applications, G may be partitioned into two sets, a
private set I1 and a public set I2. We would like to sanitize
the signal so that it is difficult for an adversary to deduce the
distribution when a post-change distribution from the private
set I1 is generating the signal. On the other hand, we would
like to retain the ability to deduce the distribution when a
post-change distribution from the public set I2 is generating
the signal. One example of such an application is activity
monitoring using wearables. In this application, we would like
to quickly detect any change from a resting state to an active
state. There are many possible active states such as walking,
running, typing on a computer, and using a mobile phone. We
would like to protect the privacy of some of these active states,
like typing on a computer or using a mobile phone, while still
being able to accurately track the other active states. Hence,
the goal of privacy-aware QCD is to perform QCD while
protecting the privacy of some active states and maintaining
some distinguishability for the other active states.
In this paper, we address the QCD problem with mul-
tiple post-change distributions while maintaining a privacy
constraint for two different privacy metrics. For each of the
privacy metrics, we propose a signal sanitization algorithm
and a stopping time that is able to identify the critical change
quickly while preserving a pre-determined level of privacy.
A. Related Work
In the QCD problem with a single post-change distribution,
when the pre- and post-change distributions are fully specified
and the change point ν is unknown but deterministic, the
Cumulative Sum (CuSum) test, developed by Page [5], is
optimal as the false alarm rate goes to zero. For the case
where the post-change distribution is not fully specified, the
GLR CuSum test is asymptotically optimal for the case of
finite multiple post-change distributions. For a comprehensive
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2overview of the QCD problem, we refer the reader to [6]–[9]
and the references therein.
In many applications, observations are obtained through
measurements taken from several wireless sensors in the
network and a fusion center decides if a change has taken
place based on the information received from these sensors.
Due to power and bandwidth constraints, the sensors are
constrained to send messages belonging to a finite alphabet to
the fusion center. This is an example in which the information
for decision-making is decentralized. The QCD problem with
a decentralized framework was first introduced in [10] and
further studied in [11]–[14] under various settings. All the
aforementioned works on QCD do not consider any privacy
constraints.
Existing work on protecting or quantifying privacy can be
divided into two main categories: data privacy and inference
privacy [15]–[17]. Data privacy refers to the protection of
the sensors’ raw information from being obtained by the
fusion center. In contrast, inference privacy refers to the
protection from an adversary’s attempt to deduce properties
of an underlying distribution. Privacy metrics proposed to
quantify data privacy include local differential privacy [18]–
[20], k-anonymity [21] and homomorphic encryption [22]. On
the other hand, privacy metrics proposed to quantify inference
privacy include average information leakage [23], [24], mutual
information privacy [15], [25], information privacy [26]–[30],
maximal leakage privacy [31], [32], local differential privacy,
hypothesis testing adversary privacy [33], and compressive
privacy [34], [35]. We refer the reader to [15], [17] for a
comprehensive discussion on the relationship between data
and inference privacy. In this paper, we use maximal leakage
privacy, and sequential hypothesis testing adversary privacy,
which is the sequential analog to the privacy metric proposed
in [33], to quantify the gain which the adversary obtains
through the observation of the signal.
There are several works in the literature that present privacy-
preserving frameworks for different signal processing tasks
[30], [36]–[38]. In [38], the authors developed differentially
private algorithms, which assume that the adversary knows
all entries of the database except one, for the purpose of
change-point detection. Unlike [38], we consider a weaker
form of privacy as this assumption may be too strong for some
applications. Furthermore, we provide theoretical guarantees
on the average run length to false alarm and the worst-case
detection delay, which are more relevant to the QCD task
as compared to guarantees on the accuracy of the estimated
change-point provided by [38], which are more suited for the
change-point detection task. In [36], the sanitization channel is
designed for general signal processing tasks while preserving
privacy, where the utility of the sanitized signal is measured
using general information theoretic quantities such as mutual
information, minimum mean-square error (MMSE), and prob-
ability of error. In [30], [37], the authors consider a fixed
sample size problem of hypothesis testing while preserving
privacy, where the utility of the sanitized signal is measured
by the Bayes error or the Type II error of the test.
B. Our Contributions
In this paper, we consider the problem of optimizing QCD
performance while preserving privacy. Furthermore, unlike the
papers mentioned above, we consider sequential signals. It
is thus possible for the adversary to obtain an arbitrarily
large number of samples to improve his guess. Our main
contributions are summarized as follows:
• We formulate the QCD problem with two privacy con-
straints, the maximal leakage privacy metric and the
sequential hypothesis testing privacy metric.
• We show that the GLR CuSum stopping time together
with a properly designed sanitization channel is asymp-
totically optimal.
• We propose relaxations and algorithms for both the cen-
tralized and decentralized versions of the QCD problem
with privacy constraints.
A preliminary version of this paper was presented in [39].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present our signal model and problem formulation. We
derive the asymptotic optimality of the GLR CuSum stop-
ping time and formulate an optimization problem to design
the optimal sanitization channel in Section III. We propose
relaxations to the channel design problem in Section IV and
present methods to solve the relaxed channel design problem
in Section V. We present the signal and sanitization model for
the decentralized privacy-aware QCD problem in Section VI
and propose methods to solve the corresponding relaxed chan-
nel design problem in Section VI-A. Results from numerical
experiments are presented in Section VII. We conclude in
Section VIII.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Let X be a measurable space, where X is a finite alphabet.
We consider a sequence of random variables X1, X2, . . .
taking values in X and independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) according to different distributions before and after an
unknown change point. Let f be the pre-change distribution
and G = {g1, g2, . . . , g|G|} be the set of possible post-change
distributions on X such that f 6= gi for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |G|}.
Let I be a random variable on the indices of G with distri-
bution pI .We assume that the sequence of random variables
X1, X2, . . . satisfy the following:{
Xt ∼ f i.i.d. for all t < ν,
Xt ∼ gi i.i.d. for all t ≥ ν,
(1)
where ν ≥ 0 is an unknown but deterministic change point, i
is the realization of the random variable I which remains fixed
for all t ≥ ν. We further assume that an adversary is interested
in obtaining information about a random variable U , unknown
to the data curator, which takes on values in a finite set U , and
that U can be expressed as a randomized function of I , i.e.,
the identity of the post-change distribution informs us about
U .
We restrict our analysis to memoryless privacy mechanisms.
A privacy mapping or sanitization channel q maps an ob-
servation X ∈ X to a random variable Y ∈ Y , where Y
is a discrete alphabet such that |Y| ≤ |X |. The sanitization
3channel q can be represented by the conditional probability
P (Y = y |X = x). Let Tq be a column-stochastic matrix with
[Tq]y,x = P (Y = y |X = x ) where [T ]y,x denotes the (y, x)
entry of a matrix T . Likewise, we represent a distribution h
on X as a column vector with [h]x = h(x) and similarly for
a distribution on Y .
At each time t, we apply a sanitization channel q to obtain
Yt = q(Xt). The sanitized signal Yt is generated i.i.d. by the
distribution f˜ = Tqf in the pre-change regime and by the
distribution Tqgi in the post-change regime, for some 1 ≤ i ≤
|G|. For a fixed q, we let
G˜ = {Tqgi : 1 ≤ i ≤ |G|}
to be the set of possible post-change distributions. Since the
distributions Tqgi may not be distinct, we have |G˜| ≤ |G|.
In this paper, we study the QCD problem with privacy
constraints using two different privacy metrics. We assume
that, at each time t, the adversary knows the pre-change
distribution f , the set G of post-change distributions, change-
point ν, the sanitization channel q, the current and all previous
observations Y 1:t = {Y1, Y2, . . . , Yt}.
The first privacy metric we consider is maximal leakage,
first proposed in [31], to quantify the amount of information
leakage an adversary is able to gain from observing the signal
{Yt : t ∈ N}, where N is the set of positive integers. Given
two random variables A ∈ A and B ∈ B, the maximal leakage
from A to B is defined as
Lmax(A→ B) = sup
U−A−B−Û
log
P
(
Û = U
)
maxu∈U P (U = u)
, (2)
where U − A − B − Uˆ denotes a Markov chain and the
supremum is taken over all such Markov chains. The quantity
Lmax(A→ B) can be interpreted as the maximum gain in bits
(if log is base 2) an adversary can achieve in guessing U by
observing B, where U is a randomized function of A. The
expression in (2) is equivalent [31] to
Lmax(A→ B) = log
(∑
a∈A
max
b∈B
P (B = b |A = a )
)
. (3)
Thus, at each time t, the maximum gain in bits an adversary
can achieve in guessing U is Lmax(I → Y ν:t).
The second privacy metric we consider is the sequential
hypothesis testing privacy metric. It quantifies the amount
of gain an adversary is able to achieve by performing a
sequential hypothesis test. Using this privacy metric, we are
able to protect a subset of the post-change hypotheses from the
inference of an adversary while ensuring the distinguishability
of the rest of the post-change hypotheses. Given a sanitization
channel q and a partition I1 ∪ I2 of the index set of G with
|I1| > 1, such that I1 is the set of indices of the post-change
hypotheses to be protected, we define
K1(Tq) = max
i∈I1
min
j∈I1
D(Tqgi || Tqgj),
K2(Tq) = min
i∈I2
min
j∈I1∪I2
D(Tqgi || Tqgj),
where D(· || ·) is the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence.
Using standard results from sequential hypothesis testing
[6, Theorem 4.3.1], assuming that the adversary is willing to
accept a misclassification rate of η, the expected number of
samples required to identify a distribution with index in I1 is at
least | log η|/K1(Tq) asymptotically as η → 0. Similarly, the
expected number of samples required to identify a distribution
with index in I2 is at most | log η|/K2(Tq) asymptotically as
η → 0.
For a fixed sanitization channel q, the QCD problem is
to detect a change in distribution as quickly as possible by
observing the sanitized signal Y1 = q(X1), Y2 = q(X2), . . .,
while keeping the false alarm rate low. In a typical sequential
change detection procedure, at each time t, a test statistic S(t)
is computed based on the observations Y1, . . . , Yt up to time
t, and the observer decides that a change has occurred at a
stopping time τ = inf{t : S(t) > b}, which is the first t
such that S(t) exceeds a pre-determined threshold b. The QCD
performance of a stopping time τ can be quantified using
the trade-off between two quantities, the average run length
to false alarm, ARL(τ), and the expected worst-case average
detection delay, EWADD(τ), defined as
ARL(τ) = E∞ [τ ] ,
EWADD(τ) = E [WADDI(τ)] ,
WADDi(τ) = sup
ν≥1
ess supEν,i
[
(τ − νc + 1)+|Y νc−11
]
,
where ess sup is the essential supremum operator, Eν,i is
the expectation operator assuming the change-point is at ν
with post-change distribution gi, and E∞ is the expectation
operator assuming the change does not occur. We should
note that typically, there are several sanitization channels q
that satisfy a privacy constraint. As the pre and post-change
distributions, {f˜} ∪ G˜, vary with the sanitization channel q,
we expect that the QCD performance varies with q as well.
It is then important for us to select the sanitization channel q
that provides the best QCD performance while satisfying the
privacy constraint.
Our privacy-aware QCD problem can be formulated as an
optimization problem as follows: given a privacy admissible
set Q and an average run length requirement γ, we seek a
stopping time τ , and a sanitization channel q such that they
are optimal solutions to the following problem:
minimize
τ,q
EWADD(τ)
subject to ARL(τ) ≥ γ,
q ∈ Q
(4)
where under the first privacy metric, the privacy admissible
set Q is defined as
Q = {q : sup
0≤ν≤t
Lmax(I → Y ν:t) ≤ }
for some given privacy budget  > 0, and under the second
privacy metric,
Q = {q : K1(Tq) ≤ 1, K2(Tq) ≥ 2}
for some given privacy budget 1 and distinguishability level
2 > 0.
4III. ASYMPTOTIC OPTIMALITY
In this section, we present the GLR CuSum stopping time
for the privacy-aware QCD problem and study its asymptotic
properties as γ → ∞. First, we note that the minimization
over the sanitization channel q and stopping time τ can be
decoupled in Problem (4). For a fixed q ∈ Q, we define
the GLR CuSum stopping time ωq and the GLR CuSum test
statistic S(t) as follows
ωq = inf {t : S(t) ≥ b} ,
S(t) = max
1≤j≤|G˜|
Sj(t),{
Sj(t) = max
(
Sj(t− 1) + log g˜j(yt)
f˜(yt)
, 0
)
Sj(0) = 0,
for 1 ≤ j ≤ |G˜|.
When the signal {Xt : t ∈ N} is sanitized using the channel
q, the GLR CuSum stopping time ωq is asymptotically optimal
[40] for the following problem:
minimize
τ
EWADD(τ)
subject to ARL(τ) ≥ γ,
(5)
with the asymptotic ARL-EWADD trade-off given as
EWADD(ωq) = E
[
log γ
D(TqgI || Tqf)
]
(1 + o(1))
as γ → ∞, where the expectation is taken with respect to I .
Let q∗ be an optimal solution to the following problem:
minimize
q
E
[
1
D(TqgI || Tqf)
]
,
subject to q ∈ Q.
(6)
Using similar arguments from [6], [41], it can be shown that
ωq∗ is asymptotically optimal for Problem (4) as γ →∞.
We call Problem (6) the channel design problem and note
that it is challenging to solve for several reasons. First, the
objective function is neither concave nor convex. Second, it is
difficult to obtain a closed form expression for the maximal
leakage privacy constraint since the alphabet size of Y ν:t
increases quickly as t→∞. The sequential hypothesis testing
privacy constraints are also neither concave nor convex. In
the next section, we present relaxations of the constraint and
objective function of Problem (6) to improve its computational
tractability.
IV. RELAXATION OF THE CHANNEL DESIGN PROBLEM
A. Relaxation of the Objective Function
In this subsection, we provide a relaxation of the objective
function in Problem (6). We propose to relax the objective
function using Jensen’s inequality:
E
[
1
D(TqgI || Tqf)
]
≥ 1
E [D(TqgI || Tqf)] .
By replacing the objective function with its lower bound, we
obtain the following relaxed problem:
maximize
q
E [D(TqgI || Tqf)]
subject to q ∈ Q.
(7)
For a fixed post-change distribution gi, with 1 ≤ i ≤ N , the
expected rate of growth of S(t) in the post-change regime
is given as D(Tqgi || Tqf). Thus, we can interpret the new
objective function as the expected rate of growth of S(t)
averaged over the different post-change distributions. Since
the stopping time ωq declares that a change has taken place
when the test statistic S(t) exceeds a pre-defined threshold b,
this means that, heuristically, a larger expected rate of growth
of S(t) gives a smaller EWADD. This intuition agrees with
the relaxed problem (7) obtained by replacing the objective
function with its lower bound 1/E [D(TqgI || Tqf)] in Prob-
lem (6).
B. Relaxation of Privacy Constraints
1) Maximal Leakage privacy: In this subsection, we focus
on the relaxation of the constraint q ∈ Q when the privacy
metric is the maximal leakage privacy. Under the maximal
leakage privacy metric, Problem (7) becomes:
maximize
q
E [D(TqgI || Tqf)]
subject to sup
0≤ν≤t
Lmax(I → Y ν:t) ≤ . (8)
As it is difficult to obtain a closed form expression for the
maximal leakage Lmax(I → Y ν:t), we approximate it using
an upper bound which is easily computable. Let J be a random
variable on the indices of G˜ = {g˜1, g˜2, . . . , g˜|G˜|}, such that
P (J = j | I = i ) =
{
1 if g˜j = Tqgi,
0 otherwise.
Let U be a randomized function of I . According to our signal
model, we have the following factorization,
PJ,I,Y ν:t,U = PJ,I,U PY ν:t|I,J,U
= PI,J,U PY ν:t|J
= PI PJ|I PU |I PY ν:t|J ,
where we use PX to denote the probability mass function
(pmf) of X and PX|Y to denote the conditional pmf of X
given Y . The following proposition provides the motivation
to relax the privacy constraint in Problem (8) to Lmax(I →
J) ≤ .
Proposition 1. For any t ∈ N, we have Lmax(I → Y ν:t) ≤
Lmax(I → J). Hence, we have
sup
0≤ν≤t
Lmax(I → Y ν:t) ≤ Lmax(I → J).
Proof: See Appendix A.
Replacing the privacy constraint sup0≤ν≤t Lmax(I →
Y ν:t) ≤  in (8) with Lmax(I → J) ≤ , we obtain the relaxed
channel design problem:
maximize
q
E [D(TqgI || Tqf)]
subject to Lmax(I → J) ≤ .
(9)
Proposition 1 guarantees that any solution to Problem (9)
satisfies the original privacy constraint sup0≤ν≤t Lmax(I →
Y ν:t) ≤ .
52) Relaxation of the sequential hypothesis testing privacy
constraint: In this subsection, we focus on the relaxation of
the constraint q ∈ Q when the privacy metric is the sequen-
tial hypothesis testing privacy metric. Under the sequential
hypothesis testing privacy metric, Problem (7) becomes:
maximize
q
E [D(TqgI || Tqf)]
subject to K1(Tq) ≤ 1, K2(Tq) ≥ 2.
(10)
Problem (10) is non-convex as the constraints K1(Tq) ≤ 1
and K2(Tq) ≥ 2 are non-convex. This makes it difficult to
have any theoretical guarantees of the global optimality of
solutions found for Problem (10). We focus on a restricted
sanitization model in order to improve the computational
tractability of Problem (10). Let C = {q1, q2, . . . , qn} be
a finite set of sanitization channels with column-stochastic
matrices T1, . . . , Tn. At each time instance t, we assume that
the observer obtains an observation Yt = (Zt, At) where
Zt = qAt(Xt) is a randomized function of the random
variable Xt under the sanitization channel qAt . We further
assume that {At}t∈N are i.i.d. generated with distribution
φ on {1, 2, . . . , n}. Under the restricted sanitization model,
rather than designing the sanitization channel q, we design the
distribution φ that samples a sanitization channel qAt from C
at each time instance t and use qAt to sanitize the signal.
For a fixed set of sanitization channels C = {q1, q2, . . . , qn}
and a fixed distribution φ, the asymptotic ARL-EWADD trade-
off of the GLR CuSum stopping time under the restricted
sanitization model can be derived, using similar arguments
from [41], to be
EWADD(ωq) = E
[
log γ∑n
c=1 φ(c)D(TcgI || Tcf)
]
(1 + o(1)),
as γ →∞. Furthermore, we have
E [D(TqgI || Tqf)] =
n∑
c=1
φ(c)E [D(TcgI || Tcf)] .
Thus, Problem (10) becomes
maximize
φ
n∑
c=1
φ(c)E [D(TcgI || Tcf)]
subject to max
i∈I1
min
j∈I1
n∑
c=1
φ(c)D(Tcgi || Tcgj) ≤ 1,
n∑
c=1
φ(c) = 1,
φ(c) ≥ 0, c ∈ {1, . . . , n},
n∑
c=1
φ(c)D(Tcgi || Tcgj) ≥ 2
for i ∈ I2 and j ∈ I1 ∪ I2.
(11)
Since D(TcgI || Tcf), D(Tcgi || Tcgj) can be pre-computed
for all c ∈ {1, . . . , n} and i, j ∈ {1, . . . , |G|}, Problem (11)
without the constraint
max
i∈I1
min
j∈I1
n∑
c=1
φ(c)D(Tcgi || Tcgj) ≤ 1
is a linear program. In the next section, we show that Prob-
lem (11) can be expressed as a mixed-integer linear program
(MILP).
V. ALGORITHMS FOR PRIVACY-AWARE QCD
In this section, methods that provide globally and locally
optimal solutions for Problems (9) and (11) are presented.
A. Maximal Leakage Privacy
1) Exact Method: From (3), 2Lmax(I→J) is an integer since
the conditional probability P (J = j | I = i ) ∈ {0, 1} is an
integer. Hence, the constraint Lmax(I → J) ≤  in Problem (9)
is equivalent to∑
j
max
i
P (J = j | I = i ) ≤ m, (12)
where m = b2c. There are at most {|G|m } ≤ m|G| different
conditional pmfs PJ|I satisfying (12), where the Stirling
number of the second kind
{
a
b
}
counts the number of ways to
partition a set of a labeled objects into b nonempty unlabeled
subsets [42]. For each conditional pmf PJ|I , we solve the
following problem:
maximize
q
E [D(Tqgi || Tqf)]
subject to Tqgi = g˜j
for all i, j such that P (J = j | I = i ) = 1.
(13)
For a fixed conditional pmf PJ|I , Problem (13) is maximizing
a convex function over a convex bounded polytope. Therefore,
an extreme point achieves the maximum value, and we are
able to solve Problem (13) by enumerating over the finite
number of extreme points of the convex bounded polytope
defined by the linear constraints of (13). A globally optimal
solution for Problem (9) can be obtained by enumerating over
all conditional pmfs PJ|I represented by a zero-one matrix
satisfying (12), and solving Problem (13) for each of these
conditional pmfs.
However, we still need to solve at least exponentially many
convex maximization problems with respect to the number
of post-change distributions |G|, since {|G|m } ∼ m|G|m! as|G| → ∞. This may be computationally undesirable when
|G| is large.
2) Augmented Lagrangian Method: We further relax the
channel design problem by relaxing the discrete constraint
(12). This relaxation allows the application of the augmented
Lagrangian method for cases where the exact method is
computationally undesirable. The constraint (12) is equivalent
to |{Tqgi : 1 ≤ i ≤ |G|}| ≤ m. In order to count the number
of distinct elements in the set {Tqgi : 1 ≤ i ≤ |G|}, we can
use the following continuous approximation,
|{Tqgi : 1 ≤ i ≤ |G|}|
= 1 +
|G|∑
i=2
i−1∏
j=1
1Tqgi 6=Tqgj
≈ 1 +
|G|∑
i=2
i−1∏
j=1
(
1
2
+
1
pi
arctan(k‖Tqgi − Tqgj‖1)
)
,
6where k is a chosen to be large and ‖·‖1 refers to the L1 norm.
Putting this back into Problem (9), we obtain the following
continuous optimization problem:
maximize
q
E [D(Tqgn || Tqf)]
subject to
|G|∑
i=2
i−1∏
j=1
(
1
2
+
1
pi
arctan(k‖Tqgi − Tqgj‖1)
)
≤ m− 1,
(14)
for which an augmented Lagrangian Solver [43], [44] can be
used to obtain locally optimal solutions [45].
B. Sequential Hypothesis Testing Privacy
In this subsection, we show that Problem (11) is equivalent
to a MILP. First, we require the following proposition.
Proposition 2. For distribution φ on {1, . . . , n}, φ satisfies
max
i∈I1
min
j∈I1
n∑
c=1
φ(c)D(Tcgi || Tcgj) ≤ 1 (15)
if and only if there exist functions
ξ : I1 → R,
δ : I1 × I1 → {0, 1}
such that
ξ(i) ≤ 1, (16)∑
j∈I1
δ(j, i) = 1, (17)
n∑
c=1
φ(c)D(Tcgi || Tcgj) ≥ ξ(i), (18)
n∑
c=1
φ(c)D(Tcga || Tcgj) ≤ ξ(i) + (1− δ(j, i))M, (19)
where M = maxc∈{1,...,n}maxi,j∈I1 D(Tcgi || Tcgj), and
i, j ∈ I1.
Proof: See Appendix B.
By Proposition 2, Problem (11) is equivalent to the follow-
ing MILP:
maximize
φ
n∑
c=1
φ(c)E [D(TcgI || Tcf)]
subject to
n∑
c=1
φ(c)D(Tcgi || Tcgj) ≥ 2
for i ∈ I2 and j ∈ {1, . . . , |G|},
ξ(i) ≤ 1 for i ∈ I1,
δ(j, i) ∈ {0, 1} for i, j ∈ I1, (20)
n∑
c=1
φ(c) = 1
φ(c) ≥ 0 c ∈ {1, . . . , n},∑
j∈I1
δ(j, i) = 1 for i ∈ I1,
n∑
c=1
φ(c)D(Tcgi || Tcgj) ≥ ξ(i) for i, j ∈ I1,
n∑
c=1
φ(c)D(Tcgi || Tcgj)
≤ ξ(i) + (1− δ(j, i))M for i, j ∈ I1.
A global optimal solution to Problem (20) can be obtain using
branch-and-bound methods on a linear program solver [46].
VI. DECENTRALIZED QCD WITH INDEPENDENT SENSOR
OBSERVATIONS
We assume that the sequence of random variables
X1, X2, . . . satisfy the observations obtained at each sensor
at any time instance are independent before the change point,
and conditionally independent given I after the change point.
The observation obtained by the k-th sensor at time t, Xk,t,
taking values in X , satisfy the following:{
Xk,t ∼ fk i.i.d. for all t < ν,
Xk,t ∼ gk,i i.i.d. for all t ≥ ν,
(21)
for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. The observations X1,t, . . . , XK,t are
mutually independent, ν ≥ 0 is an unknown but deterministic
change point and i is the realization of the random variable
I which remains fixed for all t ≥ ν. We denote the marginal
distribution of Xk,t under f and gi as fk and gk,i respectively.
For the task of privacy-aware decentralized QCD, we apply
a memoryless privacy mechanism locally at each sensor k for
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. For each sensor k, a local privacy mapping
or sanitization channel qk maps the observation X ∈ X
obtained at sensor k to a random variable Y ∈ Y , where Y
is a discrete alphabet such that |Y| ≤ |X |. The local privacy
mechanism qk can be represented by a conditional probability
P (Y = y |X = x). Let Tqk be a column-stochastic matrix
with [Tqk ]y,x = P (Y = y |X = x ) where [Tqk ]y,x denotes
the (y, x) entry of the matrix Tqk . Likewise, we represent a
distribution h on X as a column vector with [h]x = h(x) and
similarly for a distribution on Y .
At each time t and sensor k, we apply the local sanitization
channel qk to obtain Yk,t = qk(Xk,t). The sanitized signal Yk,t
is generated i.i.d. by the distribution Tqkfk in the pre-change
regime and by the distribution Tqkgk,i in the post-change
regime, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ |G|. For a fixed set of sanitization
channels {q1, . . . , qK}, we let G˜{q1,...,qK} = {g˜1, . . . , g˜|G|}
to be the set of possible post-change distributions where g˜j is
the post-change distribution generating the sanitized signal by
applying the set of sanitization channels {q1, . . . , qK} to the
observations generated by gi for some i ∈ {1, . . . , |G|}.
A. Algorithms for Decentralized Privacy-Aware QCD
For the task of decentralized privacy-aware QCD , the
sanitization channels are only allowed to use local observations
to achieve sanitization of the signal. This introduces additional
constraints on the structure of the sanitization channel q. In
this section, we present algorithms for solving Problems (9)
and (11) for the task of decentralized privacy-aware QCD.
7B. Maximal Leakage Privacy
In this subsection, we present the Local Exact Method
which solves Problem (9) exactly and has computational
complexity that scales linearly with respect to the number of
sensors K.
First, for each conditional pmf PJ|I satisfying
P (J = j | I = i ) ∈ {0, 1} for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |G|, 1 ≤ j ≤ |G˜|
and L(I → J) ≤ , we solve the following problem:
maximize
qk
E [D(Tqkgk,I || Tqkfk)]
subject to Tqkgk,i = g˜j for all i, j,
such that P (J = j | I = i ) = 1,
(22)
for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Similar to Problem (13), Problem (22)
is maximizing a convex function over a convex bounded
polytope. Therefore, we are able to solve Problem (22) by
enumerating over the finite number of extreme points on the
convex bounded polytope.
Next, for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, we let q∗k(PJ|I) be an opti-
mal solution to Problem (22) corresponding to the conditional
probability distribution PJ|I and solve the following problem:
P ∗J|I =argmax
PJ|I
K∑
k=1
E
[
D(Tq∗k(PJ|I)gk,I || Tq∗k(PJ|I)fk)
]
subject to P (J = j | I = i ) ∈ {0, 1} for all i, j,
L(I → J) ≤ .
(23)
There is a maximum of
{|G|
m
}
conditional distributions PJ|I
that satisfy L(I → J) ≤  where m = b2c and {ab} is the
Stirling number of the second kind [42]. Thus, a solution for
Problem (23) can be obtained by enumerating over the finite
set of conditional probabilities PJ|I .
In the next proposition, we show that the set of sanitization
channels obtained by the Local Exact method above is an
optimal solution to Problem (9) under the decentralized QCD
setting.
Proposition 3. Suppose the observations follow the sig-
nal model described in (21). Under the decentralized QCD
setting, {q∗1(P ∗J|I), . . . , q∗k(P ∗J|I)} is an optimal solution to
Problem (9). In particular, if g1,i = g2,i = . . . = gK,i for
i ∈ {1, . . . , |G|} then {q∗1(P ∗J|I), . . . , q∗1(P ∗J|I)} is an optimal
solution to Problem (9).
Proof: See Appendix C.
C. Sequential Hypothesis Testing Privacy
Similar to the general case, Problem (10) for the de-
centralized privacy-aware QCD problem is non-convex as
the constraints K1(Tq) ≤ 1 and K2(Tq) ≥ 2 are non-
convex. We use a restricted sanitization model to improve the
computational tractability of Problem (10). However, in the
decentralized version of the problem, each sensor is allowed
to select its sanitization channel independent of the rest of
the sensors. Let Ck = {qk,1, qk,2, . . . , qk,n} be a finite set of
local sanitization channels at sensor k with column-stochastic
matrices Tk,1, . . . , Tk,n. At each time instance t, we assume
that sensor k obtains an observation Yk,t = (Zk,t, Ak,t) where
Zk,t = qAk,t(Xk,t) is a randomized function of the random
variable Xk,t under the sanitization channel qAk,t . We further
assume that {Ak,t}t∈N are i.i.d. generated with distribution φk.
Under the restricted sanitization model, rather than designing
the sanitization channel q, we design the distribution φk that
samples the sanitization channel qAk,t from Ck at each sensor
k and time instance t. We then apply qAk,t to Xk,t to locally
sanitize the signal.
Using similar arguments from [41], the asymptotic ARL-
EWADD trade-off of the GLR CuSum stopping time under
the restricted sanitization model is given as
EWADD(ωq)
= E
[
log γ∑K
k=1
∑n
c=1 φk(c)D(Tqk,cgk,I || Tqk,cfk)
]
(1 + o(1)),
as γ →∞. We also have
E [D(TqgI || Tqf)]
= E
[
K∑
k=1
n∑
c=1
φk(c)D(Tqk,cgk,I || Tqk,cfk)
]
.
Thus, Problem (10) becomes
maximize
φ
K∑
k=1
n∑
c=1
φk(c)E
[
D(Tqk,cgk,I || Tqk,cfk)
]
subject to max
i∈I1
min
j∈I1
K∑
k=1
n∑
c=1
φk(c)D(Tqk,cgk,i || Tqk,cgk,j) ≤ 1,
K∑
k=1
n∑
c=1
φk(c) = 1
φk(c) ≥ 0, c ∈ {1, . . . , n} and k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
K∑
k=1
n∑
c=1
φk(c)D(Tqk,cgk,i || Tqk,cgk,j) ≥ 2
for i ∈ I2 and j ∈ {1, . . . , |G|}.
(24)
Using similar arguments from Proposition 2, Problem (24)
is equivalent to the following MILP,
maximize
φ
K∑
k=1
n∑
c=1
φk(c)E
[
D(Tqk,cgk,I || Tqk,cfk)
]
(25)
subject to
ξ(i) ≤ 1 for i ∈ I1,
δ(j, i) ∈ {0, 1} for i, j ∈ I1,
K∑
k=1
n∑
c=1
φk(c) = 1
φk(c) ≥ 0 c ∈ {1, . . . , n} and k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}∑
j∈I1
δ(j, i) = 1 for i ∈ I1,
K∑
k=1
n∑
c=1
φk(c)D(Tqk,cgk,i || Tqk,cgk,j)
≤ ξ(i) + (1− δ(j, i))M for i, j ∈ I1.
8K∑
k=1
n∑
c=1
φk(c)D(Tqk,cgk,i || Tqk,cgk,j) ≥ 2
for i ∈ I2 and j ∈ {1, . . . , |G|},
K∑
k=1
n∑
c=1
φk(c)D(Tqk,cgk,i || Tqk,cgk,j) ≥ ξ(i)
for i, j ∈ I1.
A global optimal solution to Problem (25) can be obtained
using branch-and-bound methods on a linear program solver
[46].
VII. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present numerical results of experi-
ments of the various methods introduced under the different
signal models. The simulations were performed using MAT-
LAB R2017a on a laptop with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6500U
CPU@2.50GHz and 16.0GB RAM.
A. Privacy-Aware QCD
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Privacy Budget ²
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
E[
D
(T
q
g I
‖T
q
f
)]
Trade-off between E[D(TqgI ‖ Tqf )] and privacy budget ²
Exact Method
Augmented Lagrangian Method
Fig. 1: Trade-off between the privacy budget  and the ex-
pected KL divergence E [D(Tqgn || Tqf)] for the Exact and
augmented Lagrangian method.
1) Maximal Leakage Privacy: In this subsection, we
present numerical results for the privacy-aware QCD task
under the maximal leakage privacy metric. We consider the
signal model with pre-change distribution f , set of possible
post-change distribution G = {g1, g2, . . . , g5} where f and G
are randomly generated, uniform prior pI on the post-change
distributions and X = Y = {1, 2, . . . , 7}.
Using algorithms described in Section V-A, we solve the
relaxed channel design problem (9) exactly and problem (14)
using the augmented Lagrangian method. First, we present
results to illustrate the trade-off between the privacy budget
 and the expected KL divergence. In Figs. 2 to 4, we plot
the pmf of the original distributions, sanitized distributions
when  = log2 1 and sanitized distributions when  = log2 3,
respectively. In Fig. 1, the expected KL divergence obtained
by each of the methods is plotted against the privacy budget
. When the privacy budget  = log2 5 ≈ 2.3, the privacy
constraint Lmax(I → J) ≤  becomes redundant as it is
trivially satisfied. Problem (4) then reduces to a standard
QCD problem without any sanitization of the observations.
It should be noted that two graphs intersect the y-axis at a
positive value rather than at zero. This is because when our
privacy budget  is zero, we only remove all information that
allows us to identify the post-change distributions. Thus, it is
possible to distinguish the post-change distributions from the
pre-change distribution in some cases. As the augmented La-
grangian method only guarantees local optimality, the channel
obtained by solving Problem (14) achieves a lower value of
the objective function as compared to the channel obtained
by solving Problem (9). Next, we plot the compute time
required for each of the methods against the privacy budget 
in Fig. 5. The results indicate that the augmented Lagrangian
method requires significantly lesser compute time compared
to the Exact method. It should be noted that the compute time
required by the Exact Method is directly proportional to
{|G|
m
}
.
The peak observed in Fig. 5 corresponds to
{|G|
m
}
achieving
its maximum at m = 3 when |G| = 5.
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Fig. 2: Pmf of pre- and post-change distributions.
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Fig. 3: Pmf of pre- and post-change sanitized distributions for
 = log2 1.
2) Sequential Hypothesis Testing Privacy: In this subsec-
tion, we present numerical results for the centralized QCD
task under the sequential hypothesis testing privacy metric.
We consider the signal model with pre-change distribution f ,
set of possible post-change distribution G = {g1, g2, . . . , g6}
with I1 = {1, 2, 3} and I2 = {4, 5, 6}, a uniform prior pI on
the post-change distributions, X = Y = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the
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Fig. 4: Pmf of pre- and post-change sanitized distributions for
 = log2 3.
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Fig. 5: Comparison of the time taken to solve the relaxed chan-
nel design problem for the Exact and augmented Lagrangian
method.
set of deterministic functions from X to Y as the finite set of
sanitization channel C. We generate f and G randomly.
Using algorithms described in Section V-B, we solve
the relaxed channel design problem (11) by solving the
MILP in Problem (20). By the data processing inequal-
ity K1(Tq) ≤ maxi∈I1 minj∈I1 D(gi || gj) = 0.9387 and
K2(Tq) ≤ mini∈I2 minj∈I1∪I2 D(gi || gj) = 0.0855, thus we
focus our attention to the region where 0 ≤ 1 ≤ 0.9387
and 0 ≤ 2 ≤ 0.0855. In Figs. 6 and 7, we plot the
pmf of the original distributions, sanitized distributions when
1 = 0.0012, 2 = 0.0024, respectively. We compare the trade-
off between the privacy 1 of I1 in G and the expected KL
divergence in Fig. 8 and the trade-off between the distinguisha-
bility 2 of I1 in G and the expected KL divergence in Fig. 9.
In both Fig. 8 and Fig. 9, we observe that the average KL
divergence increases as 1 increases and 2 decreases which
is consistent with the behaviour expected of the optimal value
of Problem (11).
B. Decentralized Privacy-Aware QCD
1) Maximal Leakage Privacy: In this subsection, we
present numerical results for the decentralized QCD task under
the maximal leakage privacy metric. We consider the signal
model described in (21). We generate fk and gk,i randomly
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Fig. 6: Pmf of pre- and post-change original distributions.
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Fig. 7: Pmf of pre- and post-change sanitized distributions for
1 = 0.0012 and 2 = 0.0024.
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such that gk1,i = gk2,i for all k1, k2 ∈ {1, . . . ,K} and
i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, use a uniform prior pI on the post-change
distributions and let X = Y = {1, 2, . . . , 5}.
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Fig. 10: The trade-off between the expected KL divergence
and the privacy budget  for different number of sensors.
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Fig. 11: The expected KL divergence achieved by the solved
sanitization channel for different number of sensors.
We solve the relaxed channel design problem (9) using the
Local Exact method described in Section VI-B for different
number of sensors K. In Fig. 10, we plot the trade-off between
the expected KL divergence and the privacy budget  for
different number of sensors K. In Fig. 11, we plot the expected
KL divergence for the privacy budget  = 0, 1, log2 5 as
the number of sensors vary between 1 and 150. The results
from the experiments indicate that for the case where the
signal observed at each of sensors are identically distributed,
the expected KL divergence grows linearly with respect the
number of sensors K. Next, we compare the compute time
taken to solve Problem (9) using the Exact method and the
Local exact method. We solve the relaxed channel design
problem (9) with a privacy budget of  = 1 using the Exact
method described in Section V-A and the Local Exact method
described in Section VI. In Fig. 12, we plot the compute time
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Fig. 12: Comparison of compute time for the Exact and Local
Exact method.
required to solve Problem (9) against the number of sensors K
for the Exact method and the Local exact method respective.
The simulation result indication that the compute time required
by Exact method increases exponentially with respect to the
number of sensors K while the compute time required by the
Local Exact method remains reasonably low.
2) Sequential Hypothesis Testing Privacy: In this subsec-
tion, we present numerical results for the decentralized QCD
task under the sequential hypothesis testing privacy metric.
We consider the signal model described in (21). We generate
fk and gk,i randomly such that gk1,i = gk2,i for all k1, k2 ∈
{1, . . . ,K} and i ∈ {1, . . . , 6}, use a uniform prior pI on
the post-change distributions, partition the index set of G into
I1 = {1, 2, 3, 4} and I2 = {5, 6}, and let X = Y = {1, 2, 3}.
We solve the relaxed channel design problem (9) using by
solving the MILP described in Section VI-C for the privacy
budget 1 = 0.025, 2 = 0.05. In Fig. 13, we present the
simulation results to illustrate the relationship between the
number of sensors and the expected KL divergence under the
decentralized signal model. As the number of sensor increases,
the privacy constraint K1(Tq) ≤ 1 becomes more difficult
to satisfy and the distinguishably constraint K2(Tq) ≥ 2
becomes easier to satisfy. Thus, we do not expect that the
expected KL divergence to grow linearly with the number
of sensors. The simulation indicates that the expected KL
divegerence does not increase linearly with the number of
sensors K.
Next, we present the relationship between the average
compute time required to solve Problem (9) and the number
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Fig. 13: The trade-off between the expected KL divergence
and the privacy budget  for different number of sensors.
of sensors K. We randomly generate 500 sets of distribu-
tions satisfying gk1,i = gk2,i for all k1, k2 ∈ {1, . . . ,K}
and i ∈ {1, . . . , 6}. For each set of distribution, we ran-
domly sample 1 with uniform probability in the interval
[0,maxi∈I1 minj∈I1 D(gi || gj)] and 2 with uniform proba-
bility in the interval [0,mini∈I2 minj∈I1∪I2 D(gi || gj)]. In the
event when the sampled 1, 2 makes Problem (9) infeasible,
we resample 1, 2. The compute time taken to solve the MILP
for each set of distributions is recorded and the relationship
between the average compute time and the number of sensors
is present in Fig. 14. The simulation results suggests that the
average compute time increases with respest to the number of
sensors K in a super-linear manner. This may be a potential
challenge for applications when the number of sensors is large.
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number of sensors K .
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed a framework for privacy-
aware QCD using two different privacy metrics for both
centralized and decentralized QCD tasks. We also proposed
optimization problems for which the solution provides a
sanitization channel where the GLR CuSum stopping time is
asymptotically optimal under each of the scenarios. We derived
relaxations to the channel design problem and provided algo-
rithms to obtain exact solutions to the relaxed channel design
problem. For the maximal leakage privacy metric, a continuous
relaxation for the channel design problem is proposed so that
locally optimal solutions can be obtained when the exact
solutions are computationally intractable. An algorithm that
scales linearly with the number of sensors is also proposed
for the decentralized QCD tasks when the signal recieved at
the sensors are mutually independent. One drawback of the
proposed signal and sanitization model for privacy-aware QCD
under maximal leakage privacy metric is the discreteness of
the privacy constraint Lmax(I → J). Using a randomization of
multiple possible sanitization channels, the privacy constraint
Lmax(I → J) is able to achieve a continuous interval of values.
The optimization problem related to this new channel design
problem is, however, much harder to solve and is a potential
direction for future work. For the sequential hypothesis testing
privacy metric, a modified sanitization model is proposed to
relax the channel design problem into a MILP for both central-
ized and decentralized QCD tasks. One interesting direction of
future work can be done to determine the pairs (1, 2) where
Problem (11) is feasible. It will also be interesting to design
an algorithm with computation complexity that grows sub-
linearly with the number of sensors for the decentralized QCD
task with the sequential hypothesis testing privacy metric.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We define the following matrices ∆ ∈ RG×U , Θ ∈
RYt−ν+1×G˜, Λ ∈ RG˜×G, Φ0 ∈ RU×Yt−ν+1 and Φ1 ∈ RU×G˜
such that
[∆]i,u = PU |I(u | i)PI(i),
[Θ]yν:t,j = PY ν:t|J(yν:t | j), (26)
[Λ]j,i == PJ|I(j | i),
and
[Φ0]u,yν:t =
{
1 if u = arg maxu∈U PU,Y ν:t(u, y
ν:t),
0 otherwise.
(27)
[Φ1]u,j =
{
1 if u = arg maxu∈U PU,J(u, j),
0 otherwise.
For a fixed random variable U that is a randomized function
of I , we have∑
yν:t
max
u∈U
PU,Y ν:t(u, yν:t)
=
∑
yν:t
max
u∈U
|G˜|∑
j=1
|G|∑
i=1
PJ,I,Y ν:t,U (j, i, yν:t, u)
=
∑
yν:t
max
u∈U
|G|∑
i=1
PU|I(u | i)PI(i) |G˜|∑
j=1
PY ν:t|J(yν:t | j)PJ|I(j | i)
 . (28)
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Similarly, we have
|G˜|∑
j=1
max
u∈U
PU,J(u, j) =
|G˜|∑
j=1
max
u∈U
∑
yν:t
|G|∑
i=1
PJ,I,Y ν:t,U (j, i, yν:t, u)
=
|G˜|∑
j=1
max
u∈U
|G|∑
i=1
PU|I(u | i)PI(i)PJ|I(j | i).
(29)
From (26) and (27), we can see that (28) and (29) can be
expressed using matrix operations
|G˜|∑
j=1
max
u∈U
PU,J(u, j) = Trace (Λ∆Φ1) ,∑
yν:t
max
u∈U
PU,Y ν:t(u, yν:t) = Trace (ΘΛ∆Φ0) ,
Furthermore, Φ1 is a solution to the following problem,
Φ1 = arg max
Γ
Trace(Λ∆Γ),
where the maximization is taken over all column stochastic
matrices Γ. Since Φ0,Θ are column stochastic matrices, we
have
Trace (Λ∆Φ0Θ) ≤ Trace (Λ∆Φ1) ,
and thus∑
yν:t
max
u∈U
PU,Y ν:t(u, yν:t) ≤
|G˜|∑
j=1
max
u∈U
PU,J(u, j).
Hence, for a fixed random variable U that is a randomized
function of I , we have∑
yν:t maxu∈U PU,Y ν:t(u, y
ν:t)
maxu∈U PU (u)
≤
∑|G˜|
j=1 maxu∈U PU,J(u, j)
maxu∈U PU (u)
.
Using the following equations [31],
Lmax(I → Y ν:t) = sup
U
∑
yν:t maxu∈U PU,Y ν:t(u, y
ν:t)
maxu∈U PU (u)
,
Lmax(I → J) = sup
U
∑
j maxu∈U PU,J(u, j)
maxu∈U PU (u)
.
to compute maximal leakage, where the supremum is taken
over all randomized functions U of I , we have
Lmax(I → Y ν:t) ≤ Lmax(I → J).
The proof is now complete.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
(⇒) Suppose the distribution φ on {1, . . . , n} satisfies (15).
Define ξ : I1 → R and δ : I1 × I1 → {0, 1} such that
ξ(i) = min
j∈I1
n∑
c=1
φ(c)D(Tcgi || Tcgj) for j ∈ I1,
δ(j, i) =
{
1 if j = arg min
∑n
c=1 φ(c)D(Tcgi || Tcgj),
0 otherwise.
We can check that ξ and δ as defined satisfy (16) to (19).
(⇐)Now suppose that there exist functions ξ : I1 → R and
δ : I1×I1 → {0, 1} such that the distribution φ on {1, . . . , n}
satisfies (16) to (19). Fix i ∈ I1. From (18), we have
n∑
c=1
φ(c)D(Tcgi || Tcgj) ≥ ξ(i),
for each j ∈ I1. Taking minimum over j ∈ I1, we obtain
min
j∈I1
n∑
c=1
φ(c)D(Tcgi || Tcgj) ≥ ξ(i).
From (17), we have ∑
j∈I1
δ(j, i) = 1.
Since δ(j, i) ∈ {0, 1}, there exists a unique j′ such that
δ(j′, i) = 1. Putting this together with (19), we obtain
min
j∈I1
n∑
c=1
φ(c)D(Tcgi || Tcgj) = ξ(i).
By (16), we obtain
max
i∈I1
min
j∈I1
n∑
c=1
φ(c)D(Tcgi || Tcgj) ≤ 1.
The proposition is proved.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Let q†1, . . . , q
†
K be an optimal solution to Problem (9) under
the decentralized QCD setting, P †J|I be the corresponding
conditional probability distribution of J given I , and µ† be
the corresponding optimal value.
Since the observations obtained by the sensors are mutually
independent, we have
E
[
D(g˜I || f˜)
]
=
K∑
k=1
E [D(Tqkgk,I || Tqkfk)] .
By our construction of q∗k(P
†
J|I), we have
E
[
D(T
q∗k
(
P †
J|I
)gk,I || Tq∗k(P †J|I)fk)
]
≥ E
[
D(Tq†k
gk,I || Tq†kfk)
]
,
(30)
for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Let µ∗ be the value achieved
by the cost function in Problem (9) corresponding to
{q∗1(P ∗J|I), . . . , q∗k(P ∗J|I)} and we obtain
µ∗ =
K∑
k=1
E
[
D(T
q∗k
(
P∗
J|I
)gk,I || Tq∗k(P∗J|I)fk)
]
(31)
≥
K∑
k=1
E
[
D(T
q∗k
(
P †
J|I
)gk,I || Tq∗k(P †J|I)fk)
]
(32)
≥
K∑
k=1
E
[
D(Tq†k
gk,I || Tq†kfk)
]
= µ† (33)
13
where the inequality from (31) to (32) is a consequence of our
choice of P ∗J|I in (23) and the inequality from (32) to (33) is
obtained by summing (30) over k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Since P ∗J|I
also satisfies
L(I → J) ≤ ,
{q∗k(P ∗J|I), . . . , q∗k(P ∗J|I)} is also an optimal solution to Prob-
lem (9). The proof is now complete.
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